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Introduction: homo economicus and rational cooperation 
When attempting to offer an explanation for the phenomenon of collective 
action, beliefs and motivating factors must first be considered. One must analyze 
the participation of the individual in collective action itself. This means exami-
ning the individual's choice between cooperative and non-cooperative strategy. 
It must be stressed that the consolidated collective action should not be justified 
in terms of benefits brought to the group. Group rationality alone, therefore, is 
not enough to explain collective action (2). 
The approach which is to be developed in this paper is that of individual 
motivations, more than the beliefs held by individuals, which shall be considered 
of secondary importance (3). Therefore, keeping in mind that these beliefs are 
fully enveloped in uncertainty, they are also subject to motivational and cogni-
tive perspectives. Following this line of thought and that which Elster (1990} 
develops, a typology of individual motivations has been proposed through which 
the individual will demonstrate his/her cooperation. Through this typology, we 
shall attempt to justify individual motives influencing an individual's attitude to-
ward cooperation - rational cooperation in agreement with the individual's 
behavior. 
However, we must first distinguish between rationality itself and social 
norms (4) as primary motives for cooperation. In order to analyze these catego-
ries, the diagram designed by Elster (1990:36} will be used as a reference (fi-
gure 1 ). There are motivations which Elster terms «second order motivations>> 
that, from a perspective of rationality, clarify if this motivation in turn is based 
on selfish or non-selfish behavior. This selfish or non-selfish rationality then opens 
() Universidade de Valencia. 
(1) In this article the author, using a more specific methodological framework, shall com-
plete to a fuller extent some of the hypotheses which were partially developed in the paper pre-
sented at the 1Oth ASEPEL T Meeting held in Albacete (Spain) in May, 1996. 
(2) Elster, J., 1990, p. 34. Elster indicates this focus from the standpoint of methodological 
individualism. He writes, «Even though by assumption it is better for all if all cooperate than if 
none do, it is also true by assumption that it is even better for the individual [ ... ] to abstain from 
cooperating.» 
(3) There are two reasons for explaining collective action through an analysis of the impor-
tance of beliefs. First, each person who potentially cooperates should bear in mind the technology 
of collective action (the benefits and costs of contributing at different levels of cooperation). Se-
cond, he/she should have an idea of what this level might be, i. e. the amount expected from 
others who cooperate. 
(4) Social norms, treated as motivations, are presented in the following section. 
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the way for a third level of personal motivations that characterize collective ac-
tion involving the individual: motivations directed towards the outcome or the 
process (in the event that there are higher rational, selfish motivations) or 
motivations based on altruism or envy and spite (in the case of non-selfish ra-
tional motivation). 
FIGURE 1 
Through this diagram, we try to gather together all types of motivations 
leading to cooperation based on rationality. Therefore, we must stress, as Elster 
does, that «the primacy of selfish and outcome-oriented motivations is a purely 
methodological one, with no implications for the empirical frequency of the va-
rious types of motivation>> (5). This is the reason why on many occasions we 
see individual behavior extended to practically the whole of society. The agents 
achieve a greater level of welfare only because a particular individual (one whose 
motivations are not related to the selfish consequence of an outcome) attains 
higher levels of welfare. In other words, levels of welfare reached by an indi-
vidual are a consequence of the increase of the aggregated welfare of the group. 
A similar outcome is obtained in situations where the benefits achieved in the 
process of performance are greater than those revealed through the outcomes 
sought by the individual. The two situations described clearly show the exis-
tence of personal behaviors or motivations, based on rationality, which are ob-
served in society and are part of the collective action carried out by the agents. 
Nevertheless, when attempting to explain the participation of the individual 
at the heart of collective action, the simplest type of motivation or behavior is 
usually used as a starting point, and this is what has methodologically cha-
(5) Elster, J., 1990, p. 36. Elster puts forth an extremely important methodological argument: 
what happens with irrational behaviors? He affirms, quite simply, that in order for these to be logi-
cal, the individuals should act rationally most of the time, thus lowering this behavior to a wider 
base of rationality. 
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racterized the literary tradition of Public Economy. According to the typology of 
Elster, this behavior could be defined as rational, selfish behavior, as directed 
towards the attainment of the outcomes (6). Further, from this standpoint, we 
understand that the strategy adopted by the individual is one of non-coopera-
tion. However, as indicated earlier, there are situations in which individual 
behavior, if it is indeed directed in this sense, may adopt the cooperative stra-
tegy so as to promote the personal interests of the agents involved in the col-
lective action. 
Therefore, there are two cases which have traditionally been described as 
true proof of rational cooperation as seen from the individual behavior des-
cribed (?). First is the situation in which any one of the individuals may express 
an interest in being the sole provider of the public good, although others may 
also have access to it. Second is the situation in which a subgroup of the indi-
viduals may oblige or inducE? the others to cooperate, carrying out such action 
with selective (positive or negative) incentives. These incentives are only used 
for individual behavior. Thus, the negative incentives (sanctions or punishment) 
are linked to non-cooperative behaviors while the positive incentives (rewards) 
are linked to cooperative choices. It is particularly important to highlight the lat-
ter case since it describes the basic case of implementing an agent capable of 
gathering enough strength and power over the other individuals so as to esta-
blish a working system of punishment incentives. With this system we can cor-
rect the non-cooperative behaviors leading to the free rider phenomenon so widely 
proclaimed by the conventional theory of public goods. Clearly, we are dealing 
with a concrete case of the second assumption. 
Additionally, the foundation on which the theory of public goods rests is 
based on this motivation of collective action (8), hence an immediate consequence 
of the classic assumptions of individual economic behavior. Yet it is necessary, 
in turn, to analyze other behaviors of collective action as seen in the empirical 
evidence as well as the individual's participation. A motivation of the aforemen-
tioned characteristics does not only influence the individual as a member of a 
community; there are many other motivations apart from individual rationality, 
such as those seen in the typology developed by Elster. Additionally, following 
this line of discussion, it is necessary to rely on social norms as a base for 
diverse behaviors. We should emphasize the variety of existing motivations which 
facilitates the attainment of an elevated degree of collective action and distances 
us from the traditional behavioral structures (9). It is at this point that we could 
begin to recreate a theory of public goods from which the consequence of free 
rider behavior is extracted, compatible with empirical evidence which, to some 
degree, does not support this individual attitude in all cases and situations. 
(6) Elster, J., 1985a, p. 243. By definition, collective action cannot arise from this motiva-
tion. 
(?) Olson, M., 1965, pp. 50-51. 
(8 ) The motivation makes reference to rational, individual behaviors, selfishly-oriented towards 
the attainment of an outcome. 
(9) This is still considered today as a «thorny» subject, given that it is a consequence of the 
interaction of the individuals who, for rnany different reasons, participate. 
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Social norms and collective action 
As we have suggested, individual motivations are not based solely on ra-
tionality. Indeed, social norms also predetermine individual behavior. Although 
less visible than the former, this form of collective action is not, by any means, 
of lesser importance. Norms of social behavior can be interpreted as the reac-
tions of the society itself so as to compensate market failures (1°). No society is 
viable without the norms and rules of behavior. These become necessary for 
viability in areas where the strict economic incentives are absent or cannot be 
created (1 1). Therefore, social norms are to be the other pillar upholding coo-
peration between individuals so as to solve the problem of collective action in 
the provision of public goods. 
Social norms as norms of cooperation 
The introduction of social norms as a foundation for the problem of collec-
tive action expands even more so to the point of view of individual behaviors. 
Not only is the traditional hegemony broken, a hegemony which bases human 
behavior on the rationality of actions, especially the economic ones, but the social 
norms also should be considered in order to take collective decisions. Here the 
hegemony of homo economicus (12) ends in the theoretical context of the 
Economy and homo sociologicus appears in comparison. The behavior of the 
former is defined by instrumental rationality, while that of the latter is dictated 
by social norms. The former is conditioned by future rewards, while the latter is 
influenced by quasi-inertial forces. The former adapts to the changing circum-
stances, seeking to improve his/her state, while the latter is unaffected by the 
circumstances, adhering to the predetermined behavior even when better op-
tions for optimizing his/her personal welfare are available (1 3). More specifically, 
there are two different models of human behavior in opposition here: on the 
one hand, that of the anti-social atom, on the other, that of the passive execu-
tor of inherited principles. 
Due to the strength of the empirical evidence itself, there is growing pres-
sure for the theoretical body of rational choice (1 4) to begin to reflect on how to 
increase cooperation among individuals through non-official, social restrictions (not 
directed from coercion) such as norms, agreements and shared values to name 
(10) Arrow, K. J., 1970, p. 20. «It is useful for individuals to have some trust in each other's 
word. In the absence of trust, it would be very costly to arrange for alternative sanctions and 
guarantees, and many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be forgone ... 
(11 ) Johansen, L., 1977, p. 148. 
(12) Elster, J., 1983, p. 21. It must be stressed that the economic human being «[ ... ] is a 
much more justified creature [ ... ] .. than the rational human being. While the latter does not entail 
anything more than consistent preferences, and therefore, consistent plans, the former has prefer-
ences which are not only consistent, but also complete, continual and selfish. 
(13) Elster, J., 1990, p. 97. 
(1 4) Traditionally this field has been responsible for analyzing problems which have arisen 
from the divergence between collective and individual interests, as well as analyzing the neces-
sary incentives for individuals to act according to the general interest. 
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a few. Thus, the objective of this new focus of rational choice implies that these 
social norms would consolidate the full compromise between the participants in 
collective action through the creation of mutually strengthening expectations C5). 
Following the conceptual framework initiated earlier through the typology of 
Elster, rational action is related to the future and conditional results which the 
individual wishes to achieve. The social norms are not normally oriented towards 
the attainment of a result, and the imperatives contained in the social norm are 
unconditional. Should the social norms be oriented toward a result, they are not 
oriented to the future, thus making the action depend on past situations and, 
occasionally, on hypothetical results. 
For the norms to be social, they should be shared by other people, being 
partially upheld by their approval and disapproval. However, these norms also 
acquire the category of 'social' in the sense that the other people (or individu-
als) are sufficiently important enough so as to ensure the fulfillment of the norms, 
expressing their approval and, naturally, their disapproval. 
In short, according to Brennan & Buchanan (1985: 53), «[ ... ] if we want to 
discover how institutional rules can turn conflict into cooperation, we cannot simply 
assume that persons who operate within those rules are naturally cooperative. 
Such a procedure would amount to removing the whole problem by assump-
tion» C6). Indeed, although the character of homo sociologicus values normative 
motivations over rational ones in order to solve the problems of collective choice, 
it would be possible to consider, in the much more global sense, if it is actually 
not this attitude of the individual which is much more logical than the one that 
is exclusively guided by rational motivations. In other words, the rationality of 
the individual, so as to solve the conflicts of collective choice (among the many 
that exist, this paper examines the one dealing with the provision of public goods), 
is more understandable if the individual is able to comprehend that these pro-
blems require a solution at the heart of the society in which all of the activities 
are carried out. It is not possible to separate, in this context, the maximization 
of individual welfare from social welfare, given that greater importance is now 
placed on public goods as an argument in the utility function of the individual. 
In addition, this causes, in turn, the utility function or welfare of the individuals 
of a community to be ever more interdependent. 
Nevertheless, it is convenient to carry out a last methodological reflection 
in this sense. Not by introducing social norms or norms of justice, such as the 
motivation of the individual to increase cooperation and thus solve the problems 
of collective choice, do we dismiss the assumption of methodological individua-
lism (17) as the most basic foundation on which the theoretical nucleus of con-
stitutional economy is consolidated. This methodological basis is completely sup-
ported within a framework in which we are able to cause the social norms to 
become endogenous so that they act as basic assumptions for individual behavior 
in the community setting. Therefore, if indeed the homo sociologicus is influ-
enced by motivations differing from those which move the homo economicus so 
(1 5) Robertson, P. J., & Tang, S., 1995, p. 70. 
(1 6 ) Buchanan, J., & Brennan, G. (1985), p. 53. 
(1 7) Methodological individualism, as is well-known, is based on individual human action as 
the fundamental element shaping the whole of social phenomenon. 
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as to increase his/her degree of cooperation in the community in which his/her 
economic activities are carried out, our proposition becomes, therefore, a ques-
tion of how to adapt homo economicus in the private sphere as homo 
socio/ogicus in the sphere of collective choice without causing the former to lose 
the basic motivation which leads him/her to cooperate and thus, to maximize 
his/her own welfare. We believe that the proper channel is through the imple-
mentation of social norms. 
It is from this point that the social norms are converted into constitutional 
norms. Obviously, the real problem to be solved is twofold. First, we must iden-
tify the social norm that respects individual action in the resolution of the pro-
blems of collective choice. Secondly, we must determine the true effectiveness 
of these norms to achieve the proposed objective. This objective is none other 
than that of increasing the cooperation of individuals in order to raise the provi-
sion of public goods toward higher, and if possible, toward the Pareto-optimal 
levels. Thus, we could then affirm that the implemented norm may be described 
as constitutional since there is not a more rational strategy of individual behavior 
than that which is considered irrational from the central focus of the conven-
tional, economic approach. 
Therefore, what is involved here is the development of rules of justice which 
help us to strengthen the justification as well as incorporation of social norms 
like motivation on which to structure the cooperation of individuals tor the provi-
sion of public goods. That is to say, we intend to otter solutions to the so-called 
tree rider behavior, which the conventional approach has always maintained, 
within the framework of voluntary provision of public goods. 
However, as observed in the diagram offered earlier, it altruistic behaviors 
have increased the explanatory level of the traditional model, the adoption or 
incorporation of norms of social justice, according to the empirical evidence, will 
also help us to resolve the existence of a voluntary provision of public goods. 
We should not forget that the voluntary provision of public goods implies the 
solution to a problem of collective choice. As such, benefits are derived from 
this action (1 8), that is, the established voluntary provision means that these be-
nefits will be obtained by individuals who make up this group or collective. Some-
times even these benefits transcend beyond the group itself. We may then in-
quire as to why there are no rules of justice applicable to_ all the members of a 
group - rules which propose that each and every one of the beneficiaries of this 
voluntary provision of the public good contributes, obligatorily, in a solidary rather 
than a coercive manner, to making this provision effective. 
The conventional approach of public economics is only concerned with the 
individual as homo economicus, i.e. how to maximize his/her own level of utility 
without considering the restriction based on some social norm that acts as a · 
motivation for individuals to cooperate (1 9). The empirical evidence shows that 
(1 8) On the contrary, there are occasionally no benefits, only costs or losses which the group 
as a collective must assume and not allow that just a few members of it to be burdened with 
them. The analysis should be extrapolatory to the opposite effect. 
(1 9) This conventional focus has been centered fundamentally on those individual behaviors 
which we have defined as rational and selfish. The result, as we all know, has led to less than 
optimal solutions based on dominant strategies like those of Nash-Cournot. 
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the degree of cooperation among individuals is higher than the theory predicts. 
It is necessary to propose a motivation of normative character through which 
the individual maximizes his/her welfare. In other words, the individual obviously 
cooperates so that the provision of public goods is effected with the objective of 
maximizing his/her welfare. What social norm can be introduced as a basic 
assumption to the conventional model? It is clear that any rule will be useful if 
it is one which the group abides by, thus serving the interests of the individual. 
To restate this idea, we could say that everyday Kantianism is a norm of justice 
which functions socially as a motivation for individuals to cooperate. The indi-
vidual is willing to assume the level of contributive effort which he/she most 
prefers; furthermore, the individual does so expecting the rest of the individuals 
of the community to assume the same. The individual then is obliged to make 
at least this effort (2o). 
However, this social norm of cooperation, if indeed strict in its conception, 
is also rather unfair. In the case that only one individual in the group is willing 
to contribute, is it fair that he/she should bear the total cost of financiation? No 
one obliges the individual to fulfill this social norm; not even the rest of the 
community is obliged to do so. In confronting this situation, it is clearly not prac-
tical to fulfill the social norm described in this context. It is necessary to loosen 
and reformulate this social norm if we want it to function for all the members of 
the community. 
Perhaps a principle of reciprocity, as a norm of justice differenciated from 
the Kantian principle or that of unconditional commitment, is indeed more plau-
sible (21 ). It is an attempt to implement a principle through which one must con-
tribute toward the voluntary provision of the public good so that principles of 
non-cooperation are not adopted when the rest of community is 'contributing. This 
principle does not require the individual to contribute more than the others, thus 
it eliminates the injustice contained in the aforementioned principle. The indi-
vidual has then obligations to the rest of the individuals whose contributions 
provide the former with benefits. For this norm of justice to work, it is not ne-
cessary for there to be a community or an organized society in the sense that 
the group of individuals which contributes is indeed a group, and the one be-
nefiting from the output provided by these individuals (even when rejecting a 
particular level of contribution) has obligations to those who contribute. In other 
words, the reciprocity among the contributions which the different individuals 
should make is itself a social norm of cooperation which may be valid for elimi-
nating free rider behavior, and therefore, valid for attaining efficient levels of 
allocation in public goods greater than those of the Nash-Cournot solution. 
(20) The original principle implies that the individual acts in such a way that he/she wishes 
that his/her behavior were the norm of universal behavior. Sugden (1984, 774) has called this the 
principle of unconditional commitment. 
(21) Ibid., p. 775. The principle described indicates that within the group, all the individuals 
make a cooperative effort of at least d except the individual i, who chooses a level of contribution 
hoping that the rest of the group members will at least match the sum. If the level of contribution 
chosen by i is not less than d, then he/she is under the obligation, in relation to the rest of the 
group, to make a contribution of at least d. 
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The explanatory limits of social norms: the reciprocity principle 
Despite the coherent development and implementation implied by the in-
troduction of this normative motivation, it is clear that the solution for suboptimality 
in the provision of public goods will not be fully solved as seen through the 
following (22). 
If we assume the function of welfare of the utility of the individual Ui is 
defined in terms of the public good, z, and the contributive effort made by the 
individual for the provision of z is qi, the following may be observed: 
Likewise, the marginal relation of substitution (MRS) between z and q is 
defined as: 
Therefore, the superior term as well as the inferior term of this ratio are 
positive for all the individuals. If the reciprocity principle indicates that each in-
dividual achieves a specific level of contribution for the provision of the public 
good, the individual i should also achieve this same level. The level of contribu-
tive effort of each individual must now be defined. The accepted alternative, first 
suggested by Feinstein and later developed by Sugden (1984), shall be the 
definition of effort as relative money contribution: the contributive effort of a person 
· is gauged in terms of his/her income. If the income of any given individual is 
taken as a parameter, this definition is coherent with the model in that the pub-
lic good to be provided may be defined as: 
(22) What we are attempting to argue is that once the restriction introduced into this model 
is structured, that is, the individual behavior under the proposed norm of reciprocity, a departure 
from the dominant equilibrium of Nash-Cournot can be reached. However, the departure proposed 
as valid responds to the individual's expectations (the individual i expects the rest of the group will 
contribute 0") bringing the level of provision to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium: 
dO'' 
-- > 0 such that 0'= z- q. 
dq; 
What we also want to obtain is that the departure is structured institutionally, which implies 
that we are moving the problem from the standpoint of conventional rationality as a singular source 
of behavior towards the field of collective choice. Indeed, in this context, the assumption of iden-
tical preferences must not be confused with the symmetric equilibriums, given that in the conven-
tional model the latter leads us to worse solutions than the initial Nash-Cournot. Now the domi-
nant strategy is not the maximization of welfare based on conventional rationality (i. e. the 
non-cooperative type). 
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The public good z depends on the total effort made by all individuals. The 
parameter ai is a positive constant for each person and is used to present the 
conceptual level of contributive effort, since even with the equal effort of each 
one, not all these efforts carry the same weight in the financiation of the public 
good to be provided. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the reciprocity principle is put into practice 
in the group of persons who so desire it. If the provision is to be extended 
throughout the society, a society which is larger than the group itself, the func-
tion F must be constructed and defined for a given vector of the levels of con-
tribution q= (q1, q2, .•. , qn). Thus, for each group of individuals G, and for each 
level of contributive effort of the members of group <>. F( G, <>) is defined by (23): 
This function F offers us the amount of public good provided when each 
member of the group contributes d, and the other individuals who do not belong 
to the group contribute qk. For each group of type G defined and for each one 
of its members, using as a constant the contribution qk of the individuals k (k ~G), 
if the amount qi G = () is adopted as that which maximizes the utility function 
Ui[d, F(G, <>)] upon deciding individual i what level of contribution should be 
chosen for all the members of the group, this becomes the amount that he/she 
would choose (24). 
However, this model fails to give the optimal solution (in Paretian terms) to 
the necessary contribution q which is required to achieve private or voluntary 
provision of the public good. In other words, in the general case in which there 
is a pattern of non-identical preferences (qi, z) for each one of the individuals i, 
the only thing that can be guaranteed is the existence of the vector of equilib-
rium q of the individual contributions. Considering the case in which the indi-
vidual i does not contribute anything, one can assume that he/she does not 
belong to the group G of contributors. By definition, G is the largest group of 
individuals obliged to contribute a quantity, say yq, so the individual i is not obliged 
and does not belong to the group. Therefore, the contribution of this individual 
i is compatible with his/her obligation to contribute. Any individual j (\1 j::;:. i) that 
belongs to G is obliged to contribute yq, given that everyone in the group con-
tributes the same amount. There is a vector q representative of the level of 
contribution in that each individual contribution of the members of G equals at 
least yq. This process may be repeated for other groups (25) G', G", etc. in which 
(23) Each level of contribution will depend on the group of individuals G who are taken into 
consideration, in addition to the contributive effort 8 made by said individuals. 
(24) Sugden, R., 1984, pp. 772-778. The reciprocity principle can be summarized as follows: 
the individual i is obliged to contribute at least q;G since the rest of the individuals contribute the 
same amount. Likewise, if some are contributing less than this amount, the individual i becomes 
obliged to contribute at least as much as any other member of the group. 
(25) Any other group G', G", etc. is a subgroup of the group G. The construction of these 
groups is based on what the individuals who make up the group contribute thereby conditioning all 
of the group members to contribute at least the same amount. 
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we would find vectors of the level of contribution q', q", etc. corresponding to 
each one of them. This repetition could be carried out to the point of achieving 
a vector q·, beyond which it is impossible to find another group of individuals 
which contributes more, but given the initial assumption of reciprocity as already 
established, the rest of the individuals of this last group defined is contributing 
the same amount. If this vector of individual contributions fulfills the aforemen-
tioned assumption, obviously, for each one of the individual contributors q;, this 
vector q· is the value of the contributions that maximizes the individual's utility 
or welfare function U; (V i = 1, 2, 3, .. , n). Therefore, in the context of non-identi-
cal preferences described, there is no guarantee of being able to achieve a single 
vector of contributions which maximizes the utility of all the individuals of the 
group. On the contrary, the vector of individual contributions q· is at least guar-
anteed to exist. 
Nevertheless, the vector of equilibrium of individual contributions will only 
meet the Pareto-optimal conditions when the individual preferences of each one 
of the contributors are identical. Moreover, the Pareto-optimal level of provision 
corresponds to the vector of individual contributions q = (q', q', ... , q'), where 
q' = qF V i and s represent the group of all the individuals. Thus, only in the 
case where the individuals choose the same level of contribution is the Pareto-
optimal provision possible, although uncertain. We shall examine all of this in 
more detail in the next section. 
Limiting conditions for the optimum: identical preferences and optimal 
provision 
As an applicable social norm through which a process of cooperation can 
be established in order to achieve an effective voluntary provision of public goods, 
the reciprocity principle may be set up as an operative instrument for solving 
the free rider phenomenon. But only in one particular case can the Pareto-op-
timal provision be obtained. This case corresponds to that of the contribution (26) 
achieved through the same level of effort by each and every one of the mem-
bers of the group, and therefore, a sufficient level to arrive at a solution to the 
problem of the free rider. In the other cases, a suboptimal provision may be 
guaranteed, although it is greater than that which is obtained through the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium. Nevertheless, this guarantee still does not resolve the fact 
that there is a certain degree of free rider behavior in the individuals of the 
community under analysis. 
There are two conditions necessary to achieve a Parteo-optimal level in 
voluntary provision: 
1) All the individuals of the group must be the same, i. e. all must 
manifest identical levels of preferences; thus, the level of welfare 
(26) The level or effort to contribute has been defined in terms of the level of monetary 
income of each one of the individuals while also considering the contribution of each individual in 
the function of the provision of the public good z. Not because an individual contributes less than 
another should he/she be considered a free rider. 
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of each individual i of the community may be justified through the 
same arguments of the utility function (z, q; ), so that each one of 
the individuals has the same identical arguments in their utility func-
tion; and 
2) The function of the provision of the good z is explained by the 
linear function, i.e. Z= (3L.;q;. 
Given the initial restriction of reciprocity as well as the fact that the obliga-
tion to cooperate will be the same for each person in the group, the equilibrium 
contribution of each individual is also the same, thus, z = (3nq;. In other words, 
everyone shows the same vector corresponding to the level of contribution which 
is achieved in order to provide the public good. The equilibrium, therefore, is 
reached between the space defined as follows: 
1) The level of contribution (q;M, (3nqM) in which the first order condi-
tion of optimization is fulfilled, i. e. where the MRS is equal to the 
MRT, thus h; ( q;, z) = (3n, being then qM the contribution that the 
individual i prefers the rest of the group members to make; and 
2) The minimal contribution i is willing to make and reciprocally pre-
fers the rest of the group to make as well. This corresponds to the 
level of contribution qm, obtained in the space ( qm, (3nqm) in which 
h;(q;, z) = (3. Therefore, the level of the equilibrium takes place at 
the level q' (as defined before), if and only if the contribution of 
each individual is included in the space: 
Only in this case is each individual obliged to match reciprocally the level 
of contribution of the others without any other principle of selfish-interests or non-
reciprocity implying a greater contribution than that resulting from the application 
·of this principle. In the case of q' < qm, each individual would see that his/her 
own interest leads to greater contributions, even when there are no expecta-
tions as to whether the other individuals adopt the reciprocity principle. On the 
contrary, if q' > qM, each individual would be contributing more than what corre-
sponds to him/her, which would probably never happen, since no individual would 
wish to be under this type of obligation in any kind of group (27). 
Finally, and in agreement with the aforedescribed, there is only one equi-
librium that fulfills the Pareto-optimal criteria. It is the one which coincides to the 
level of the maximum contribution qM in which the equality of the marginal rela-
tions of substitution and the transformation of each contributor is produced. This 
level of contributive effort achieved will correspond to the Pareto-optimal level of 
voluntary provision that the group is able to provide. Any other equilibrium of 
the defined space will produce a suboptimal level of the provision of the public 
good under this social norm of behavior presented so far. 
(27) Sudgen, R., 1984, p. 778. 
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Non-identical preferences and suboptimization: the general case 
The problem now established is that of the search for a level of provision 
of public goods in which, as we shall see, the contributions individuals make (if 
indeed based upon reciprocity) will not be enough to ensure a Pareto-optimal 
level of voluntary provision. Therefore, the search is to lower or correct the degree 
of free rider behavior that may exist in the contributions of individuals. In other 
words, it is necessary for each individual to contribute more, knowing that the 
others are doing likewise. The problem arising in this context is that no one 
wants to be the first to contribute more than the others. If all the individuals 
know there is a norm of reciprocity for the contribution that each one is to make, 
and if the preferences are not identical, the problem becomes a question of 
discovering who is willing to take the first step toward achieving an optimal 
voluntary provision of this public good. Who is interested in having the voluntary 
provision of the public good reach a higher level? If we leave aside this ex-
treme solution in which there is an individual who, for selfish reasons of per-
sonal interest, can indeed make the provision (given that the benefits alone jus-
tify the cost of contributing), the problem becomes to decide who, of all those 
involved, will take the initiative so that each one, reciprocally, contributes to reduce 
the difference that is needed, thus achieving the provision. In short, we are facing 
a problem of collective action, specifically one of a variant of the «chicken game» 
which is referred to as the strategy or war of attrition. In this context it is clear 
that the first to cooperate voluntarily is the one individual who cannot wait any 
longer for the voluntary provision to be carried out, so that the rest of the indi-
viduals of the community will begin, later, to contribute according to the applica-
tion of the reciprocity principle which has been implemented as an initial as-
sumption and to which all the individuals of a community adhere. In addition, it 
is a game of waiting in that: 
[ ... ] waiting is an effective revelation mechanism only when it hurts 
[ ... ] How much of the value of the public good one is willing to forgo 
by waiting is directly related to one's cost of providing the good. 
[ ... ]Thus, people have the opportunity to prove how large their costs 
are by waiting. Eventually, the person with the lowest cost will be-
come impatient and, having been outwaited, will decide to supply the 
public good (28). 
Moreover, once the individual i has taken the initial step toward the neces-
sary contribution and if, additionally, the public good is guaranteed to be pro-
vided in this way, consider the first moment in which the other individuals de-
cide to adopt the principle of non-cooperation. This would be the dominant 
strategy if we were in an environment of individual economic rationality follow-
(28) Bliss, C. & Nalebuff, B., 1984, pp. 2-3. 
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ing the traditional approach (29). However, as indicated earlier, we are influenced 
by the initial assumption of reciprocity among the different individuals who wish 
to benefit from the provision of the public good. 
Furthermore, in this context of non-identical preferences in which a vector 
of contributions of equilibrium is obtained, yet it is not the Pareto-optimum (since 
it does not fulfill the two premises put forth in the prior section), the problem 
becomes one of finding out who will be the first person to cooperate. If we start 
with the fact that all individuals are not identical and not all will be equally pa-
tient, what we have are different costs for each individual in order to achieve 
voluntary provision. Therefore, the one who assumes the lowest costs in mak-
ing the first contribution will be the individual who initially reveals his/her willing-
ness to do so eo). The others will cooperate by contributing at least the same 
amount given that reciprocity exists as a social norm. The solution will be ob-
tained in terms of the size of the group of contributors. The larger the group, 
the more likely we are to find this individual. Additionally, opening the group to 
new individuals increases the probability of making the contribution before too 
much time goes by, although it may increase or diminish the possibility of some-
one acting almost immediately. It is clear that, if we study a group that is grow-
ing, we will see that as the size of this group approaches infinite, the time of 
waiting before the first person contributes approaches zero. Indeed, someone 
will contribute immediately upon finding incentive in not waiting, given that his/ 
her costs in the provision of the public good are zero, which means the free 
rider problem will disappear e1). So in locating the first contributor, the problem 
we face is solved. 
Lastly, one can affirm that if no principle of reciprocity exists as a social 
norm under which all individuals are motivated to cooperate, the solution could 
never be furnished by the adoption of strategies based on the assurance game, 
and much less on strategies of attrition. The absence of reciprocity would mean 
(29) Taylor, M. & Ward, H., 1982, pp. 350-370. This would be the dominant strategy in the 
case of a prisoner's dilemma. Upon introducing reciprocity as a restriction to the maximization of 
personal utility, a type of brinkmanship prevails such as that of the assurance game. This means 
that the individual creates and widely announces that he/she intends to convert cooperation into a 
relatively undesirable, although viable, option. In other words, knowing that the contribution of the 
individual is insufficient in order to provide the public good, or that it may only be enough to pro-
vide a small percentage of it, each individual will prefer not to cooperate if the others behave in 
this way, but (in the case of reciprocity) the individual may prefer to contribute if the others con-
tribute too. 
(3°) It is a question of determining the degree of patience of each individual in relation to 
the costs undertaken in order to carry out the provision. Therefore, the most impatient individual is 
the one who has the least costs to undertake. 
(31) Bliss, C., & Nalebuff, B., 1984, p. 3. This argument suggests the free rider problem is 
greater when dealing with only a limited group of potential contributors. Thus, we can affirm that 
the larger the contributing group is, the easier it is to solve the problem of the free rider. «Even 
in small groups, company is appreciated while waiting for a volunteer; more people in the same 
boat helps make everyone better off, (p. 11 ). One should remember, in agreement with Olson 
(p. 35), a widely celebrated result in a context of conventional rational economy is that «the larger 
the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good." Through 
this new point of view, as developed in this paper, the exact opposite takes place. 
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returning to the model of the prisoner's dilemma in which individual rationality, 
based on the maximization of self-interest as a dominant strategy would create 
an unlimited wait for each individual. There are two basic reasons why no vol-
unteer would appear to take the initial step. First; through this strategy, all the 
individuals have an elevated cost to undertake in order to supply the public good. 
Second, if someone contributes enough to carry out the provision, the others 
understand perfectly that the free rider strategy is the one that best maximizes 
their welfare. In this case, as the group grows, the problem of the free rider 
worsens. Therefore, it is necessary to continue the search for «more gracious 
ways to find a volunteer than relying on brinkmanship. Binding agreements com-
bined with side payments can always produce a superior outcome. [ ... ] Relying 
on a private individual to supply a public good is usually the last option>> (32). 
o·n' the contrary, one exception can be made to the aforesaid. In the case 
described earlier, the voluntary provision is made by an individual or a group of 
individuals which is smaller than the target group since their self-interests with 
the objective of maximizing their utility function and the benefits taken would 
outweigh the costs associated with this provision. This indicates a behavior which 
is rational as well as selfish in that it is aimed at attaining an outcome. In other 
words, we would find ourselves, once again, facing a behavior of rational coop-
eration. 
Conclusions 
Through this paper we have attempted to argue that once implemented 
the assumption to be introduced into the model (i. e. the individual behavior under 
the norm of reciprocity), a departure from the Nash-Cournot equilibrum is, there-
fore, created. Additionally, the departure which is implemented responds to the 
individual expectations described earlier (33). 
The departure then becomes a positive approximation to the Pareto-opti-
mal equivalent. It is also a question of a departure that is institutional, which 
brings us to how the problem, as seen from the perspective of conventional 
rationality as the only source of behavior, is taken to a more cooperative stand-
point. Now the dominant strategy is not the maximization of welfare based on 
conventional rationality. Moreover, it is possible then for homo economicus in 
the purest state to be transformed so as to adopt the premises of homo 
sociologicus, of course, without relinquishing the defining characteristics of indi-
vidualism. 
In summary, the analysis carried out in this paper has clearly shown that 
the voluntary provision does exist and is produced at levels which, even being 
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at suboptimal levels, are higher than those achieved through the Nash solutions. 
This evidence carries the following implications: 
1) The Theory of Collective Action is justified, and thereby locates an 
important area of action in order to possibly move this provision 
toward higher levels; 
2) As the only one capable of correcting the free rider behavior (al-
though this would require a separate study), the public provision 
establishes itself as a serious alternative to the private provision, 
although the role assigned by conventional theory of public eco-
nomics to the latter has always been scarce, if not, altogether 
nonexistent; 
3) The idea of appealing to the central authority as the only efficient 
agent-supplier of public goods is not so clear. Even if these public 
goods were so pure (in the Samuelsonian sense), the instruments 
which are used to achieve a Pareto-optimal public provision are 
scarcely operative (34); 
4) Finally, through all that we have seen, the conventional idea of 
appealing to the central authority to supply those purely public 
goods is not justified. The theory assumes, given the appearance 
of free rider behavior, that public goods would never be provided 
through voluntary mechanisms. Furthermore, this would open an-
other debate on the free rider behavior adopted by the central 
authority itself when sufficient voluntary provision of the goods is 
already being supplied (35). 
(34) Are the mechanisms of Clarke-Groves or the ones like Groves-Ledyard really effective 
for solving the free rider problem? Likewise, are the political mechanisms of representation really 
efficient in offering a solution to the revelation of individual preferences and, consequently, to the 
function of social welfare? This is where the problem related to the public provision of public goods 
truly lies. 
(35) See Becker, E., & Lindsay, C. M. (1994} who offer a surprising analysis of this type of 
behavior. 
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